Leo Van Zyverden and Sytske Van Zyverden v. Ralph W. Farrar and Helen R. Farrar et al : Reply Brief on Cross-Appeal by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1963
Leo Van Zyverden and Sytske Van Zyverden v.
Ralph W. Farrar and Helen R. Farrar et al : Reply
Brief on Cross-Appeal
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald C. Barker; Attorney for Appellant;
George M. McMillan; Attorney for Respondents;
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Zyverden v. Farrar, No. 9946 (Utah Supreme Court, 1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4324
. 6 ~ c,. , , p:t·. . A- f 
f-v~, ~~~£- t~c(~, ~J«.~(Ir' - _ .. -
~<(~ 7~ -(1) 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEO VAN ZYVERDEN and SYTSKE VAN 
ZYVERDEN, his wife, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs, Respondents 
and Cross-Appellants, 
RALPH W. FARRAR and HELEN R. FARRAR, 
his wife, Defendants, and SEAGULL IN-
VESTMENT COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
SEAGULL INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
Plaintifl and Appellant. 
vs. 
LEO VAN ZYVERDEN and SYTSKE VAN 
ZYVERDEN, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 9945 
No. 9946 
Reply Brief on Cross-Appeal 
Cross-Appeal from the Judgment of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court in No. 9945 (2449 below), 
Honorable R. L. Tuckett, Judge 
Ronald C. Barker 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Seagull 
lDvesUJlellt Com~ 
George M. McMillan 
1020 Kearns Building 
Salt L~ke City, Utah 
Attmuey for Van Zyverdens 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Introductory Statement ------------------- __ _ ________ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 3 
Point I. The Cross Appeal is properly before the 
~ourt. -----------------------------------------------·-··························· ~ 
Point 2. 'Tan Zyverden's clai1n for relief is sup-
ported by the evidence. . ............ _ ....... _ __ __ ___ _ __ _ _ _ ___ __ _ _ __ ____ I 0 
Point 3. ,.fhe 'ran Zyverden's should have been 
allowed to prove damages. -------------------------------------------- 14 
Summary and ~onclusion ------------------------------------------ 16 
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 
4 Am J ur 2d, Appeal and Error § 177 ---------------- 5, 6 
Buttrey Y. Guaranteed Securities Co. ( 1931) 
78 Ut. 39 300 P. 10-:tO ---------------------------------------- 5 
28 USCA § 732 b 7 FCA Title 28 § 732b, _________ 6 
Hadley Y. Baxendale (1854), 9 Ex. ~h. 341 ---------- 14 
Jenkins Y. ~Iorgan (1953) 123 Ut. 480, 
260 p ( 2d) 532 -------------------------------------------------- 15 
Maw v. Noble (1960) 10 Ut(2d) 325, 
353 p (2d) 165 ---------------------------------------------- 12, 13 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Melford State Bank v. Westfield Canal & Irrigation 
Company (1945) I08 Ut. 528, I62 P (2d) IOI .. II 
Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford Ace. & 
Ind. Co. 7 Ut. ( 2d) 377, 325 P ( 2d) 906 __________ 14 
UCA 1943, as amended, Sec. 20-2-4.10 ---------------- 6 
UCA I953, Volume 9 ------------------------------------------------ 5 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule I (a) ------------ 6 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 73 __________ 8, 9, 10 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7 4 (b) 
---------------------------------------- 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, IO 
Welchman v. Wood (I960) IO Ut. (2d) 325, 
353 p (2d) I65 -------------------------------------- I2, 13, I4 
Western Development Co. v. Nell (I955) 
4 Ut ( 2d) II2 288 P ( 2d) 452 -------------------------- II 
.. 2.: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEO VAN ZYVERDEN and SYTSKE VAN 
ZYVERDEN, his wife, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs, Respondents 
and Cross-Appellants, 
RALPH W. FARRAR and HELEN R. FARRAR, 
his wife, Defendants. and SEAGULL IN-
VESTMENT COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
SEAGULL INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellaat 
vs. 
LEO VAN ZYVERDEN and SYTSKE VAN 
ZYVERDEN, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 9945 
No. 9946 
Reply Brief on Cross-Appeal 
INTRODUCTORl"'" S'TA'fE:\IENT 
The Rules do not make provision for filing of a 
brief in response to an appellant's reply brief. In the 
instant case, ho,vever, the appellant has advanced some 
arguments in its reply brief which were not and could 
not haYe been reasonably anticipated in the respondent's 
3_ 
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original brief. In view of the novelty and importance 
of the questions raised it seems appropriate to file a 
short brief dealing 'vith the newly raised issues. 'This 
brief does not attempt to restate the facts, or to reargue 
the questions involved 'vith respect to applicable theo-
ries of unlawful detainer or restitution of the premises. 
POIN'l, I: THE CROSS .1-\.PPEAL IS PROP-
ERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
In its reply brief Seagull has challenged the juris-
diction of the court to consider the cross appeal. 
Seagull's attack on the Court's jurisdiction appears 
to be due to a confusion in the meaning of the terms 
"appeal"and "cross appeal." In former Utah practice 
the terms meant th~ same thing with regard to proce-
dural requirements, but under modern Utah practice 
they do not. Under former practice the qualifying ad-
jective "cross" was used to designate an appeal by a 
party who was already a respondent in another appeal 
from the same case. The designation was used as a mat-
ter of convenience and did not indicate that the cross 
appeal was a special procedure that differed from any 
other kind of appeal. 
The term "cross appeal" under modern practice 
both in Utah and other states has a special meaning. 
It does not exist as a special procedural technique under 
the Federal Rules of Procedure. (Rule 74 (b) of the 
Utah Rules is not found in the Federal Rules) . 
A cross appeal is a special procedural technique 
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that perruits an appellant to seek appellate relief as an 
ineident to proceedings already before the revie,ving 
court by the appeal of the opposing party. '"fhe pro-
ceeding is availnble only where authorized by statute 
or procedural rules. 4 ..~1 1n. Jur. 2d, 687 Appeal and 
Error § 177. 
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of CiYil Proce-
dure the cross appeal did not exist as a separate pro-
cedural technique. (See Note under Rule 7 J (b) in \r ol-
tnne 9 UC1\, 1953. An exatnination of prior statutes 
and the case la \V sho\vs this note to be correct.) \ \rhile 
the courts made occasional reference to "cross appeals'' 
it is clear from both interpretation and discussion that 
the tertn cross appeal ,,·as synonotnous both in mean-
ing and requirements with the term "appeal." For an 
excellent discussion on this point see Buttrey v. Guar-
anteed Securities Company_, (1931} 78 Ut. 39, 300 
P. 1040. (Subsequent case la\v, statutes,and procedure 
made no changes in the la'v there discussed until the 
adoption of the rules in 1949 and their implementation 
in 1950.) 
Under former la\v, Utah law and procedure recog-
nized only one kind of appeal and the requirements for 
appeal fell alike on both the appellant and the respond-
ent. Each, in effect, if he desired to appeal had to meet 
the same requirements and to perfect separate appeals. 
'fhe teclmique was wasteful of time of the litigants, 
tin1e of the court, and was slo,v, tmnecessarily trouble-
some, duplicative of both time and effort by each liti-
gant, and unnecessarily expensive. 
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It is clear that the creation of cross appeals in Utah 
by the adoption of the Rules is harmonious with the 
basic concert and purpose of the rules. That purpose 
has been enunciated many times by this Court, and is 
nowhere better expressed than in Rule I (a) : 
"These rules ... shall be liberally construed 
to secure the just_, speedy_, and inexpensive de-
termination of every action.'' (Emphasis added). 
The creation of the cross appeal in Utah by Rule 
7 4 (b) has the salutary effect of making the determi-
nation of action on appeal more just, speedy, and in-
expensive than the for1ner procedure with no possibility 
of prejudice to the litigants. ( 4 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, at 
page 688). 
The cross appeal created under the new practice 
is merely a simplification of the former procedure which 
required the respondent to 1nake a separate appeal. The 
new procedural technique is both sound and practical. 
It dispenses with notice, bond, and other procedural 
technicalities which are admittedly important when a 
matter is first appealed, but become merely burdens 
unnecessarily imposed when both the parties and the 
action are already before the Court. 
It is true that the Utah act which enabled the Su-
preme Court to adopt the Rules {20-2-4.10 UCA 1943, 
as amended) carried with it restrictions adopted frorn 
the language of the enabling act for the federal rules. 
(28 USCA § 732 b_, 7 FCA Title 28 § 732 b.) Such a 
restriction was necessary because of the Constitutional 
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requirernents of scpuration of po\\·ers, but it clearly 
applies to Iuatters that are clearly a question of sub-
stantive rights not merely n1atters of procedure. In a 
sense, any change of procedure that per1nits a different 
kind of procedure ''modifies'' the ''rights of the liti-
gants. rl,he argunlent is especially pernicious under the 
instant circtunstances 'vhere Seagull argues that the 
\'"an Zyverdens should be denied their right to cross 
appeal becau~e the Trail Zyverdcn's have conzplied 1.cith 
the l'tl'istiny procedure and thus failed to follrnc the 
former different procedure. But Seagull,s argument 
is not only unfair; it is also unsound. .1\pplying the 
traditional test of substance and procedure enunciated 
by the ~-,ederal courts under the Erie doctrine, it can 
readily be seen that the outcome of the case on the 
1nerits is not going to be affected by a change in time 
and manner of filing· additional questions on appeal. 
The argun1ent that the enabling act restricted the 
po,ver of the Supreme Court to adopt new rules that 
did not preserve the antiques of the old procedure is 
untenable. Seagull's argument that any change in the 
old procedure is beyond the power of this Court because 
it ·'abridges,~' '"enlarges," or "modifies" the substan-
tiYe rights of the litigants in this (or any other) case 
is not supported by any authority. 
The basic attack 'vhich the appellant Seagull makes 
on the validity of Rule 7 ~ (b) is that the Supreme 
Court has changed the time in "~hich a cross appeal can 
be filed. Since there v,·as no such tiling as a cross appeal 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
before the Rules, the Rules did not change the time 
for filing cross appeals they created it. If Seagull's 
attack depends, as it does, on Utah law prior to the 
Rules, then it should be directed at the modification of 
time made under Rule 73. Seagull seems obsessed ""rith 
the thought that Rule 73 which deals with appeals and 
not cross appeals applies also to cross appeals. But 
Seagull is understandably silent jn attacking the re-
duction of time from 90 days allowed by the procedure 
just prior to the rules to the one month (not the 30 
days of the Federal Rules) permitted by the Utah 
Rules. The time for appeals has been changed several 
times in Utah procedure. It has been as high as one 
year and as short as one month. The inconsistency of 
Seagull's argument is apparent. If "changing" the 
time for cross appeals under Rule 74 (b) "modifies" 
substantive rights, then the actual change of time for 
appeals under Rule 73 (a) must also ~'modify" sub-
stantive rights. 'l,hat is particularly true in the instant 
case. The Van Zyverden's have complied with the re-
quirements of the 74 (b) for a cross appeal. If that 
action was now held to be invalid, and the one month 
requirement of 73 (a) was nonetheless held to be valid, 
the '"'" anZyverden's would be completely deprived of 
a right to appeal. Such a determination would clearly 
"modify" and "abridge" the rights of the Van Zy-
verdens. It is submitted, however, that the whole argu-
ment is ridiculous. To hold otherwise would give pro-
cedural problems the status of substantive rights and 
.8 
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'\'ould pull a thread that \Vould unravel the \\~hole fabric 
of the Utah Rules of l~ivil Procedure. 
The new procedure does not affect anyone's sub-
stantive rights in any 'vay except that it provides tna-
chinery to resolve them more justly, more speedily, and 
less expensively. Both the problems of time of filing 
and questions of how particular matters can be brought 
before the Court are clearly procedural tnatters and 
not substantive ones. 'l,he outcome of a case on the 
Inerits is not going to be affected by the fact that an 
appeal n1ust no'v be filed in one month instead of the 
DO days, six n1onths, or a year permitted by former 
practice; or by the faet that a cross appeal can be filed 
after the one n1onth pero:d (but still less than 90 days) ; 
or by the fact that the cross appellant does not have 
to file a bond. 
Rule 73 (c), which requires a bond on appeal, does 
not and should not apply to cross appeals. The purpose 
of the bond is to protect parties from spurious, harrass-
ing, or financially irresponsible appeals. 'Vhen an 
original appellant has already brought the matter be-
fore the Supre1ne Court and posted bond, additional 
cost burdens are not likely going to be created by the 
consideration of a cross appeal. Rule 7 4 (b), which 
creates the procedural concept of cross appeal, makes 
no bond requirement. It is clear that case law prior 
to the rules 'vhich dealt with "cross appeals" that were 
procedurally and practically no different from regular 
appeals is not applicable to the new "cross appeal" 
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created by Rule 74 (b). Since a cross appeal is not an 
appeal, Rule 6 (b) on enlargement of time is applicable 
to cross appeals and Rule 73 (a), ''lrhich deals only with 
appeals, does not apply. 
Neither the la'v nor the concept of the rules justi-
fies an acceptance of the appellant's attack on the rules 
or its attack on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
to consider the cross appeal. 
POINT II. 
VAN ZYVERDEN'S CLAIM FOR RELIE~_, 
IS SUPPORTED BY THJ~ E-VIDENCE. 
In their reply brief, the defendant concedes that 
the plaintiff's case is based on the meaning of the con-
tract provision 'vhich states that the Hi-Land milk 
base can be exchanged for livestock or horses of equal 
value. 
The problem of construing contract language has 
been confronted many times by the Supreme Court of 
Utah. Even experienced lawyers experience difficulty 
in drafting contracts with the absolute precision that 
is often necessary to avoid lawsuits. A certain degree 
of ambiguity is present in every written document and 
especially, as here, in documents drafted by parties only 
casually acquainted with the law. As has been said, the 
heart of this lawsuit is to determine the intentions of 
the parties. Their conduct and the language they adopt-
ed are equally relevant in determining such intentions. 
10 
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Seagull argues that the \"'an Zyverdens are seeking 
to Hreform" the contract by parol. This is not so. \"'an 
Zyverdens do insist that the trial court should have 
been primarily concerned \\·ith the intent of the parties 
as evidenced by the contract, the facts surrounding the 
CL~'ccution of the contract, and by the interpretation 
\vhich the parties themselves place upon it. Case }a,\· 
eited by Seagull to the effect that the court 'viii not 
consider external evidence inconsistent with the work-
ing of the contract is not here applicable. 
The fact that there is argument over the meaning 
of the representation in the contract is evidence of some 
degree of atnbiguity. The language of this court in 
lJ'lelford State Bank v. Westfield Canal Irrigation 
Company (1945} 108 Ut. 528, 162 P(2d} 101, is par-
ticularly appropriate: 
''The disagreement of the parties interested 
clearly shows that the contract involved is am-
biguous and "·ithout extrinsic evidence the true 
intentions of the parties cannot be determined." 
In Western Developnzcnt Company v. ?\;ell (1955} 
4 t_rt. (2d) 112, 288 P (2d) 452, this Court held that 
intention of the parties' controls and "·here that inten-
tion can be discovered from the instrument that the 
Court will not invoke arbitrary rules of construction. 
The Court approved the consideration of extrinsic 
evidence to assist in determining the intent of the lan-
guage of the instrument, and the Court further held 
that proof of intent of a different meaning than the 
usual ~meani1tg of the words -r.oas permissible. 
11 
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In Maw v. Noble (1960) 10 Ut. (2d) 440, 354 I) 
(2d) 121, the Court stated: 
"The primary and a more fundamental rule 
is that the contract must be looked at realistically 
in the light of the circumstances under "\vhich it 
was entered into, and if the intent of the parties 
can be ascertained with reasonable certainty it 
must be given effect." 
Seagull spends much time in their brief discussing 
various evidentary and speculative considerations (for 
example the elaborate speculation on pages 9 and 10 
of reply brief of what the Van Zyverdens' proof of 
loss might have shown) that are really not germane to 
the issues. The real issue of this case, as they concede, 
is whether "can be exchanged" is a warranty. 
The Utah law on warranty in real estate contracts 
is set out in (1960) Welchman vs. Wood~ 10 Ut.(2d) 
325, 353 P (2d) 165. ,-fhe Court quoted the Sales Act 
and recognizing that the Sales Act normally deals with 
the sale of goods. It stated that the warranty portion 
was an accurate statement of property law. This Court 
held that a promise or affirmation of fact is an express 
warranty if the natural tendency thereof is to induce 
and it does induce the party to enter into the trans-
action. 
It is evident that intent is an essential consideration 
in any alleged v~rarranty. Only through a consideration 
of the surrounding circumstances can a court determine 
if a party was induced into purchasing by a represen-
tation. Seagull challenges the materiality of the intent 
12 
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in an nppurent attetnpt to blur the fact that even 
~,urrar's o'vn t('stitnony sup~orts the in1portance of this 
representation in eft'ecting the sale. 'l,he \?"an Zyverdens 
are not, of course, trying to reform the instrument by 
parole as Seagull suggests. 'fhey are only asking this 
l,ourt to recog·nize that the evidence sho,vs that (I) 
Farrar did make the representation; (2} the tendency 
of the representation was of such a nature that its 
natural tendency would be to induce the \?"an Zy,·erdens 
to buy; ( 3) \Tan Zyverden made certain that the pro-
vision "·as in the contract before he agreed to buy and 
therefore it did induce him to buy. 
Seagull concedes that in spite of the fact that 
Farrar represented that the milk base and equipment 
could be exchanged that it in fact could not, but they 
insist that the \ran Zyverdens had constructive kno,vl-
edge of this fact. Even if that is true, (which Re-
spondents stoutly deny) it does not relieve Farrar or 
his assignee, Seagull, from the warranty. A person can 
even warrant that things which cannot possibly happen 
""ill occur and the 'varrantor by his warranty agrees 
to respond in damages for their non-occurrence ( fV elch-
ma,n vs. Wood~ supra). 
Seagull alleges that since 'Tan Zyverden 'vas the 
one ,vho inserted the provisions that it must be con-
strued against him. That is not an accurate statement 
of the la"·· This Court held in (1960} Maw vs. Noble~ 
10 Ut. (2d) 440, 354 P (2d} 121, that the Court should 
first consider the surrounding circumstances. Only if 
13 
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they cannot determine the intent of the parties from 
the surrounding circumstances should the rule of strict 
construction be applied against the draftor. Even 
though the facts of this case do not justify its applica-
tion here, it is respectfully submitted that such a rule 
should have no application in warranty considerations 
at all, since a person who desires a warranty is most 
likely to be the one who insists on it being inserted 
in a contract. 'l.,o apply an arbitrary rule of law that a 
representation could not be a warranty because it was 
drafted by the party who sought to rely on it would 
seem to defeat the basic purpose of warranties. 
POINT THREE: THE VAN ZYVERDENS 
SHOULD HAVE BE E N ALLOWED TO 
PROVE DAMAGES. 
The Van Zyverdens' right to damages is clearly 
enunciated in W elchn~an v. Wood_, cited supra, it is in 
the language of the Court, 
"A person may "\varrant the occurrence of 
future events or of events which could not pos-
sibly happen. The substance of such a warranty 
is in effect a pronLise to respond in damages prox-
imately caused by the non-existence of a repre-
sented fact." (Emphasis added). 
It is clear that rule of Hadley v. Baxendale_, 'vhich 
is elaborated in the 'ran Zyverdens' earlier brief, is· 
applicable in Utah. ln Pacific Coa·st Title Ins. Co. v. 
Hartford Ace. & Ind. L10. (1958) 7 Ut. (2d) 377, 325 
P. (~d) 906, this Court .stated the rule as follows: 
14. 
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"The rule ns to \vhat damages are recoverable 
for breuch of contract is based upon the concept 
of reasonable foreseeability that loss of such 
general character \vould result fron1 the breach. 
'fherefore, to be compensable, the loss n1ust re-
sult fron1 the breach in the natural and usual 
course of events, so that it can fairly and reason-
ably be said that if the minds of the parties had 
adverted to breach when the contract \vas made, 
loss of such character would have been within 
their contemplation." 
'fhe 'ran Zyverdens should ha , .. e been allowed to 
put on proof of loss of profits. The Utah la"· on this 
point is stated in (1960) Jenl1·ins v. 1lloryan, 12:3 Ut. 
480, 260 P(2d} 532: 
"Prospective profits to be derived from a busi-
ness which is not yet established, but n1erely in 
conte1nplation are generally too uncertain and 
speculative to forn1 a basis for recovery. 
[but] 
... the language of Rule 73 (d) allowing dam-
ages for delay may in a proper case permit com-
pensation for some increased beneficial use where 
the objection as to the e1tterprise~s speculative 
character is overco1ne by compete·nt proof.n 
(Emphasis added) . 
This language clearly shows that loss of profits 
in a prospective business are recoverable if they are 
proven. 
It will be noted that the Court rejected the offer 
of proof, not as incompetent proof, but on the mistaken 
theory that such damages were not recoverable. It is 
_15 
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this error that requires reversal on the portion of the 
case respecting damages. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Respondent's cross-appeal complies with the ap-
plicable rules of this court as they are presently con-
stituted. The substantive rights of the appeal are not 
affected by the changes in the procedural requirements 
incident to cross-appeals. 'I" he authorities cited by the 
appellants under the old statutes are not applicable. 
The authorities cited by the appellants overlook 
the fact that the primary concern of courts in the con-
struction of contracts is to determine the intention of 
the parties. Particularly in the light of Welchman v. 
Wood_, it is apparent that the parties intended that the 
seller was warranting the fact that the milk base could 
be exchanged. Seagull must be made to respond in 
damages for the non-occurrence of the event which was 
warranted. All of the damages sustained by the "\ran 
Zyverdens, including the reasonably justifiable loss of 
profits, are recoverable by them and should be offset 
against any liability to the sellers under the agreement. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMI'.fTED, this lith 
day of December, 1963. 
GEORGE M. l\1cMILLAN and 
V. RENE NELSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
1020 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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